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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to elucidate the use and role of diagrams in the design of 
present day high energy physics experiments. To this end, drawing upon a prominent account of 
diagrammatic representations advanced by the cognitive scientists Jill Larkin and Herbert Simon, 
I provide an analysis of the diagrammatic representations of the data selection and acquisition 
procedures presented in the Technical Design Report of the ATLAS experiment at CERN’s Large 
Hadron Collider, where the Higgs particle was discovered in 2012. Based upon this analysis, I 
argue that diagrams are more useful than texts in organizing and communicating the procedural 
information concerning the design of the aforementioned experimental procedures in the ATLAS 
experiment. Moreover, I point out that by virtue of their representational features, diagrams have 
a particular communicatory value in the collaborative work of designing the data acquisition 
system of the ATLAS experiment. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In relatively recent years, quite a number of diverse case-studies concerning the use of visual 
displays—such as graphs, diagrams, tables, pictures, drawings, etc.—in both the physical and 
biological sciences have been offered in the literature of the history and philosophy of science 
(HPS)—see, e.g., Miller 1984; Lynch and Woolgar 1990; Baigrie 1996; Pauwels 2006. These 
case-studies have shown that visual representations fulfill important functions in both the 
theoretical and experimental practices of science, thereby emphasizing the non-verbal dimension 
of scientific inquiry that had been neglected by the traditional language-based conception of 
science, which takes the production, justification and dissemination of scientific knowledge to be 
essentially linguistic processes expressed in the form of scientific theories and hypotheses.1 
The notion of diagrammatic representation has been long studied by cognitive scientists in 
relation to the issue of problem solving and thinking with diagrams, as well as in relation to the 
																																								 																				
1 This conception dates back to the writings of the logical positivists who characterized scientific discourse in terms 
of the logical and linguistic structures of scientific theories. Karl Popper, who was the earliest critic of logical 
positivism, as well as the philosophers of the post-positivist era in the philosophy of science—such as Norwood 
Russell Hanson, Thomas Kuhn and Imre Lakatos—also saw scientific inquiry mainly as a linguistic process driven 
by scientific theories and hypotheses.   
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analysis of cognitive processes involved in diagram interpretation and understanding (see, e.g., 
Cheng et al. 2001). However, even though historians and philosophers of science have drawn 
upon the resources of cognitive science to account for the cognitive aspects of scientific inquiry 
(see, e.g., Giere 1992), the HPS literature concerning the use of diagrams in scientific practice 
has not sufficiently benefited from the literature of cognitive science on reasoning with diagrams. 
The present paper is an attempt to make use of the resources of cognitive science to understand 
the role of diagrammatic representations in the current practice of experimental high energy 
physics (HEP).  
Using diagrams to describe experimental procedures is an established practice in experimental 
HEP. For example, block diagrams2 and flowcharts3 were used in the technical design reports of 
the HEP experiments performed in the eighties and nineties, such as Large Electron-Positron 
Collider (LEP) experiments at CERN (see LEP Collaboration 1984) and the Collider Detector II 
(CDF II) experiment at Fermilab (see CDF II Collaboration 1996). In this paper, as a case study, I 
will examine the use of diagrams in the design of the data acquisition system of the ATLAS (“A 
Toroidal Large Hadron Collider Apparatus”) experiment that has been running at CERN’s Large 
Hadron Collider (LHC) in Geneva since September 2008 (see ATLAS Collaboration 2008). The 
ATLAS experiment is a multi-purpose experiment aimed to test the prediction of the Higgs boson 
by the Standard Model (SM) of elementary particle physics,4 as well as to test a wide range of 
theoretical models—often referred to as the “models beyond the SM” (BSM models)—which 
have been offered as possible extensions of the SM in the literature of HEP (see, e.g., Ellis 2012). 
In 2012, the long-sought Higgs boson was discovered in the ATLAS experiment (ATLAS 
Collaboration 2012), as well as in the CMS experiment (CMS Collaboration 2012), which is the 
other multi-purpose experiment currently running at the LHC. As I shall show in this paper, 
different types of diagrams borrowed from the literature of System and Software Engineering 
(SSE)5 are used in the ATLAS Technical Design Report (ATDR),6 which is a technical document 
that contains the design information concerning the principal components and functions of the 
ATLAS data acquisition system (ATLAS Collaboration 2003). It is to be noted that the diagrams 
																																								 																				
2 A block diagram is a type of diagram that represents the main parts of a system as blocks connected through lines 
that show the relationships between different parts of the system. 
3 A flowchart is a type of diagram that represents the different steps of a process by connecting them through arrows.   
4 The SM of elementary particle physics consists of two gauge theories; namely, the unified theory of the weak and 
electromagnetic interactions, and the theory of quantum chromo-dynamics that describes strong interactions.	
5 SSE is a discipline concerned with the diagrammatic modeling of information systems for design and analysis 
purposes (see Booch et al. 2007; Hoffer et al. 2008). For a philosophical discussion concerning diagrammatic 
modeling in SSE, see Karaca 2012. 
6 The ATDR for data acquisition was reviewed by the Large Hadron Collider Experiments Committee (LHCC). The 
LHCC reviews the technical design reports of the experiments planned to run at the LHC, and makes 
recommendations to the CERN Research Board that takes final decisions regarding experimental proposals. The 
approved proposals become part of the CERN experimental program. It is stated in the minutes of the LHCC’s 67th 
meeting held on 26-27 November 2003 that the LHCC recommended general approval of the ATDR to the CERN 
Research Board. It is also stated in the minutes of the 167th meeting of the Research Board held on 26 February 2004 
that the ATDR was approved by the CERN Research Board. The minutes of the meetings of the LHCC and those of 
the CERN research board, as well as the information regarding these experimental committees, can be accessed at 
the URL: http://committees.web.cern.ch/Committees I am grateful to Peter Jenni, former spokesperson of the 
ATLAS experiment, for clarifying the review process of the ATDR, as well as for drawing my attention to the 
aforementioned minutes of the LHCC (personal communication, July 22, 2014). 
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of SSE I will analyze in this paper are much more complex than block diagrams and flow charts 
used in the technical design reports of the LEP and CDF II experiments.  
 
Before I start discussing the use of diagrams in the case of the ATLAS experiment, in the next 
section, I will offer a brief overview of the HPS literature on the role of non-verbal reasoning in 
scientific practice.  
 
2. HPS perspectives on non-verbal reasoning in scientific practice 
 
In the HPS literature, the role of non-verbal reasoning in scientific practice has been most 
prominently studied by David Gooding in the context of scientific experimentation. Gooding has 
pointed out that even though “human agency is essential to both exploratory observation and 
experimental testing” (Gooding 1990a, p. 10) it has not been addressed by the standard 
philosophy of science that “has sought to reduce the interaction of theory and experiment to a 
logical relationship, that is, a relationship between propositions” (Gooding 1992, p. 65). In 
Gooding’s view, however, this is an untenably simple view of the relationship between theory 
and experiment, as “[m]uch of what experimenters do involves nonverbal doing” (ibid., p. 66). 
Gooding’s proposed solution to remedy this shortcoming is to elucidate what he calls the 
“procedural knowledge” of experiment that is manifest in the implementation of experimental 
procedures (Gooding 1990b, p.177).7 To this end, Gooding has introduced a diagrammatic 
notation8 for mapping experimental procedures and applied it to the case of Michael Faraday’s 
electromagnetic induction experiments in order to characterize the human agency involved in 
performing these experiments in terms of Faraday’s “conceptual and material manipulations” 
(Gooding 1990a,b). Using his diagrammatic notation and Faraday’s laboratory notes, Gooding 
has provided, what he calls, the “experimental maps” of Faraday's manipulations during the 
course of his experiments—as shown in Figure 1. In Gooding’s view, these maps make visible 
the human agency that is essential to perform Faraday's experiments.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
7 Here, Gooding draws upon a standard distinction in epistemology—originally due to Gilbert Ryle (1945)—between 
two types of knowledge, namely, declarative knowledge (“knowing-that”), and procedural knowledge (“knowing-
how”), which are respectively defined to be the knowledge of facts, things, or concepts, and the knowledge of 
performing actions. 
8 Gooding’s notation is an elaboration of an earlier notation introduced by Ryan Tweney (1989) to map the 
procedures of Faraday’s electromagnetic induction experiments.	
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Figure 1: A Gooding map, and its caption, (Gooding 1990b, p. 180) that represents “Faraday’s 
decision to build a setup, experiment with it, and represent and record outcomes” (ibid., p. 179). 
In this map, a “square denotes the outcome of manipulations in the material, phenomenal world 
(such as noticing, seeing, recording); and a circle denotes the outcome of mental operations (such 
as imagining, visualizing, describing, inferring, comparing) […] a solid triangle indicates a 
change of a major goal or method (e.g., from seeking evidence for one hypothesis to proving the 
methods used to obtain that evidence)” (ibid., p. 177-178). 
 
Moreover, Gooding has argued that the visual imagery, which consists of lines of force and 
magnetic curves, Faraday created and used in his experiments was essential to his theorizing of 
the law of electromagnetic induction. In Gooding’s view, through this visual imagery and the 
physical concepts it implied, Faraday was able to make the phenomenon of electromagnetic 
induction accessible to visual perception and eventually to verbal expression in the form of a law 
of nature. 
 
Unlike Gooding, Nancy Nersessian has examined the role of internal representations associated 
with mental processes taking place during scientific reasoning, rather than external 
representations provided by visual displays. Nersessian has long advocated an approach, which 
she calls “cognitive-historical method,” to analyze the problem solving practices of scientists 
(Nersessian 1992). This method is based on the idea that the resources of cognitive science can be 
used to elucidate some historical cases of scientific reasoning (Nersessian 2008, chap. 1). In 
accordance with her cognitive-historical method, Nersessian (ibid., sect. 4.1) has adopted the 
“mental models framework,” which emerged in the literature of cognitive science in the 1980s 
following the seminal work of the cognitive psychologist	Philip Johnson-Laird (1980, 1983).9 
Instead of subscribing to an already existing account of mental models, Nersessian has advanced 
her own account, which she calls the “minimalist mental modeling hypothesis” (Nersessian 2008, 
p. 128). According to this account, in certain problem solving tasks, human reasoning is carried 
out by means of the construction, implementation and manipulation of a mental model, which 
Nersessian defines as “an organized unit of knowledge that embodies representations of 
spatiotemporal relations, representations of situations, entities, and processes, as well as 
representations of other pertinent information, such as causal structure” (ibid.). 
 
																																								 																				
9 For an overview of different accounts proposed in the mental models framework, see Nersessian 2008, sect. 4.1. 
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Nersessian’s main purpose in drawing upon the mental models framework is to understand how 
human reasoning is modeled during scientific inquiry. Nersessian has applied her account of 
mental modeling to James Clark Maxwell’s work on electromagnetism. She has argued that 
Maxwell’s train of thought leading to his derivation of the electromagnetic field equations can be 
seen as reasoning through a mental model (ibid., chap. 5). Nersessian has noted that various 
diagrams, such as the “vortex-idle wheel” diagram introduced by Maxwell, assisted him in his 
reasoning with the mental model he worked with. This last point concerns the issue of how 
mental models interact with external representations such as diagrams.10 Nersessian has argued 
that there exist “correspondences between elements of mental models and elements represented 
in diagrams, [in the sense that] manipulating the components of a diagrammatic representation as 
one perceives it or acts on it can lead to corresponding transformations of the mental model 
(ibid., p. 161). In this way, according to Nersession, diagrams have the potential to facilitate the 
human reasoning process through interplay with mental models (ibid.). 
 
In this paper, I will not address the issue of how scientists reason through mental models during 
scientific inquiry. Rather, in line with Nersessian’s cognitive-historical method, I will elucidate 
the role of diagrammatic representations in the design of experimental procedures in the context 
of the ATLAS experiment. To this end, I will draw upon a prominent account of diagrammatic 
representations advanced by the cognitive scientists Jill Larkin and Herbert Simon (L&S) (1987). 
In passing, let me note that Nersessian has also drawn upon L&S’s account to argue in what 
respects diagrammatic and propositional (sentential) representations differ from each other 
(Nersessian 2008, chaps. 4 and 5). But, she has not applied L&S’s account to a case study to 
examine the role of diagrammatic representations in scientific practice.  
 
3. L&S on differences between diagrammatic and propositional representations 
 
In a seminal paper, entitled “Why a diagram is (sometimes) worth ten thousand words,” L&S 
(1987) have contrasted diagrammatic representations with propositional representations in order 
to characterize how these two types of knowledge representation differ from one another with 
respect to reasoning involved in problem solving in domains such as physics and geometry. In 
L&S’s account, a propositional representation is a “data structure in which elements appear in a 
single sequence” (ibid., p. 68), whereas a diagrammatic representation is a “data structure in 
which information is indexed by two-dimensional location” (ibid.). Based on these definitions, 
L&S suggest that the “fundamental difference between our diagrammatic and sentential 
representations is that the diagrammatic representation preserves explicitly the information about 
the topological and geometric relations among the components of the problem, while the 
sentential representation does not” (ibid., p. 66). Therefore, the distinction L&S draws between 
diagrammatic and propositional representations indicates that, unlike propositional 
representations, “[d]iagrams are a kind of analogical (or direct) knowledge representation 
mechanism that is characterized by a parallel (though not necessarily isomorphic) correspondence 
between the structure of the representation and the structure of the represented” (Kulpa 1994, p. 
77). 
																																								 																				
10 The same issue has been also addressed in the literature of cognitive science; see, e.g., Scaife and Rogers 1996; 
Hegarty 2004; Liu and Stasko 2010.  	
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L&S offer two main reasons “why a diagram can be superior to a verbal description for solving 
problems” (L&S 1987, p. 98). The first reason concerns what they call the “localization of 
information” (ibid.), namely, the spatial groupings of information that is necessary to solve a 
problem. In L&S’s account, in diagrammatic representations, since “information is indexed by 
location in a plane, many elements may share the same location, and each element may be 
“adjacent” to any number of other elements” (ibid.). Diagrams thereby “can group together all 
information that is used together” (ibid.), and their use in domains of problem solving (such as 
geometry and physics) substantially reduces the need to search for the pieces of information 
relevant to make a problem solving inference. Unlike in diagrammatic representations, in 
propositional representations, since “the data structure is indexed by position in a list […] each 
element [lies] “adjacent” only to the next element in the list” (ibid.). As a result, the related 
pieces of represented information get increasingly separated from each other in propositional 
representations as the amount of information increases, thus working against the spatial 
localization of information (ibid., p. 69). This in turn makes propositional representations less 
efficient than diagrammatic representations to solve problems in domains such as physics and 
geometry.  
 
The second main reason L&S offer concerns the perceptual ease provided by diagrams in 
problem solving. Since there exists a structural correspondence (not necessarily one-to-one), in 
terms of spatial relations contained, between the information and its diagrammatic representation, 
the latter has the ability to “automatically support a large number of perceptual inferences, which 
are extremely easy for humans” (ibid., p. 98). For instance, “when we draw a rectangle and its 
two diagonals, the existence of the point of intersection of the diagonals is inferred 
automatically—the point is created on the paper, accessible to perception” (ibid.). However, since 
no structural correspondence exists between spatial relations and their corresponding 
propositional representations, information regarding spatial relations is not readily available to 
visual perception when represented by texts and needs to be inferred from the syntactic and 
semantic structures of sentences, thus making texts less efficient than diagrams in terms of the 
representation of spatial relations.  
 
In L&S’s account, two “representations are informationally equivalent if all of the information in 
the one is also inferable from the other, and vice versa […] Two representations are 
computationally equivalent if they are informationally equivalent and, in addition, any inference 
that can be drawn easily and quickly from the information given explicitly in the one can also be 
drawn easily and quickly from the information given explicitly in the other, and vice versa” 
(ibid., p. 67). In L&S’s account, diagrammatic and propositional representations are not 
computationally equivalent, in that by virtue of spatial localization of information and perceptual 
ease provided by diagrams, the ease and rapidity of making a problem-solving inference through 
diagrammatic representations are considerably greater than through propositional representations. 
It is important to note that, in L&S’s account, as the title of their 1987 paper also indicates, the 
above-mentioned virtues of diagrams should not be taken to imply that they are always superior 
to propositional representations for problem solving. Rather, in order for a diagram to be useful 
in the problem-solving process, it must be constructed in such a way to take advantage of the 
above-mentioned virtues of diagrammatic representations (ibid., pp. 98-99).  
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The above overview suggests that L&S provides a ground not only to account for the use and 
function of diagrammatic representations in experimentation, but also to compare the 
diagrammatic and propositional representations of experimental procedures to assess their 
relative effectiveness. In this paper, I shall make use of L&S’s account to examine the 
diagrammatic representations of data selection and acquisition procedures presented in the 
ATDR, as well as to compare them with the corresponding textual descriptions. It is worth noting 
that typically relatively simple examples of diagrams, such as those used in physics and geometry 
textbooks, have been examined in the literature of cognitive science. In this sense, the diagrams 
of SSE used in the ATDR present a novel case in which to analyze the differences between 
diagrammatic and propositional representations, in that the foregoing diagrams are far more 
complex and standardized than those diagrams previously considered in cognitive science 
studies.  
 
4. Description of the ATLAS data acquisition system through diagrams 
 
In order for a HEP experiment to achieve its intended objectives, what are often called interesting 
events11 need to be acquired during the process of data acquisition. Interesting events are those 
collision events that are considered to have the potential to serve the objectives of the experiment. 
Given that in HEP experiments, new particles are detected through their signatures, i.e., stable 
decay products, the collision events that contain the signatures of novel particles are considered 
to be interesting in the aforementioned sense. In the case of the ATLAS experiment, interesting 
collision events refer to those collision events that contain the signatures of the Higgs boson 
predicted by the SM and those of the novel particles predicted by the BSM models, such as 
superpartner particles predicted by supersymmetric models. The foregoing signatures include 
single particles, namely, photons and leptons12 with transverse momentum (𝑝!)13 at or above 𝑂 10  𝐺𝑒𝑉, and jets with 𝑝! at or above 𝑂 100  𝐺𝑒𝑉, as well as missing or total transverse 
energy (𝐸!) at or above 𝑂 10  𝐺𝑒𝑉.14  
 
The process of data acquisition in the ATLAS experiment is carried out in three stages by using 
trigger systems that perform an online selection (i.e., while proton beams are colliding inside the 
LHC) of interesting events according to a set of pre-determined selection criteria called a trigger 
menu.15 The selection criteria are given in terms of the aforementioned signatures. Table 1 
illustrates a sample trigger menu that consists of some of the major data selection criteria used in 
the ATLAS experiment. Each selection signature (or criterion) given in the left column of Table 
1 is denoted as ‘𝑁𝑜𝑋𝑋𝑖.’  Here, ‘𝑁’ denotes the minimum number of signatures required for a 
																																								 																				
11 In the terminology of experimental HEP, a collision event is defined to be a set of particle interactions that occur 
as a result of one bunch crossing, which takes place when two beams of particles collide with each other inside the 
particle collider. 
12 A lepton is a spin ½ particle that interacts through electromagnetic and weak interactions, but not through strong 
interactions. In the SM, leptons include elementary particles including electron, muon, tau, and their respective 
neutrinos. 
13 Transverse momentum (𝑝!) is the component of the momentum of a particle that is transverse to the proton-proton 
collision axis inside the ATLAS detector, and transverse energy (𝐸!) is the energy due to transverse momentum. 
14 For a thorough discussion of interesting events in the case of the ATLAS experiment, see ATLAS Collaboration 
2003, sect. 4. 
15 For the details of how selection criteria are determined, see ATLAS Collaboration 2003, chap. 4. For a 
philosophical discussion, see Karaca (forthcoming).  
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particular selection, and ‘𝑜’ denotes the type of the selected signature; e.g., ‘𝑒’ for electron; ‘𝛾’ 
for photon; ‘𝜇’ for muon; ‘𝑥𝐸’ for missing 𝐸!; ‘𝐸’ for total 𝐸!; and ‘𝑗𝐸’ for total 𝐸! associated 
with jet(s). The label ‘𝑋𝑋’ denotes a lowest 𝐸! (in units of 𝐺𝑒𝑉) for the signature under 
consideration, and ‘𝑖’ denotes an isolation requirement for the given signature. For example, the 
selection criterion ‘𝑒25𝑖’ in Table 1 amounts to the requirement of at least one isolated electron 
with an 𝐸! at or above 25 𝐺𝑒𝑉. The right column of Table 1 shows the processes predicted by the 
SM and the BSM models to which the selection signatures in the left column of the same table 
are relevant (for details, see ATLAS Collaboration 2003, sect. 4.4.1). 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Major selection criteria used at the ATLAS experiment. (Source: ATLAS Collaboration 
2003, p. 38)  
 
 
The first stage of the data acquisition process is carried out by the level-1 trigger system that 
performs a crude selection of potentially interesting events from the collision events detected by 
the calorimeter and muon detectors, which are the components of the ATLAS detector system. 
The level-1 trigger system produces a trigger decision within 2.5 microseconds and thereby 
reduces the LHC event-rate frequency of 40 MHz down to the range of 75-100 kHz. For future 
reference, note that the regions in the ATLAS detector that contain signals for interesting events 
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are called “regions of interest” (RoIs) and that the RoIs and the energy information associated 
with the signals detected inside the RoIs are together referred to as the “RoI data.” 
 
In addition to the calorimeter and muon detectors, the tracking detectors are also used in the 
ATLAS experiment.16 Since the event rate is so high and thus the trigger decision time is so 
short, it is technologically impossible for the tracking detectors to determine particle tracks 
quickly enough for the level-1 event selection. Only the hit points produced by particles inside 
the tracking detectors could be recorded. These space points are later assembled by software 
algorithms in order to determine particle tracks. As a result, the data from the tracking detectors 
are not used directly by the level-1 trigger system for event selection. Moreover, due to the 
shortness of the level-1 trigger-decision time, even though the hit points are recorded, they are 
not completely read out from the tracking detectors during the level-1 selection. This means that 
the information (i.e., in terms of location in the detector, and 𝑝!  or 𝐸! for each particle or jet 
contained, or associated missing 𝐸!) necessary to fully specify a selected event is fragmented 
across the individual detectors of the ATLAS detector system, and all pieces of this fragmented 
information are not assembled yet so as to fully describe a selected event. Therefore, the full 
description of the event is not yet known, and as a result, the level-1 event selection is performed 
without full granularity, i.e., without the availability of data from all the channels of the 
individual detectors.  
 
The level-2 and level-3 trigger systems, which are jointly called the High Level Trigger (HLT) 
system, have longer trigger decision times and thus can provide much finer selections of 
interesting events than the level-1 trigger system. The event-accept rates of these trigger systems 
are respectively around 2 kHz and 200 Hz.17 Unlike the level-1 trigger system that is hardware-
based, the HLT system is software-based, meaning that event selections are performed directly by 
specialized software algorithms. In the diagram shown in Figure 2, which illustrates what is 
called a communication diagram18 in SSE, the sub-units of the HLT system are represented as 
objects, and the messages exchanged among them are represented by text-labeled solid arrows. 
As shown in this communication diagram, the level-2 event selection begins when the sub-unit 
called “level-2 supervisor,” denoted as “LVL2Supervisor”, sends the results of the level-1 
selection to the sub-unit called “level-2 processing,” which is denoted as “LVL2Processing 
Unit.” Unlike the level-1 trigger system, the level-2 trigger system uses the RoI data processed by 
the sub-unit called “Read-out System” (ROS) from all the sub-detectors of the ATLAS detector 
																																								 																				
16 In HEP experiments, the tracking detectors are used to determine particle tracks as well as to measure the 
momenta of electrically charged particles by means of the curvatures of their tracks in a magnetic field. 
17 These and previous event-accept rates are valid for early data taking at the LHC, as they have later changed 
significantly. 
18 In SSE, a communication diagram (also called a collaboration diagram) provides a diagrammatic representation 
of the ways in which a particular set of objects exchange information with each other during a certain period of time 
in order to achieve a common purpose (see, e.g., Booch et al. 2007, sect. 5.14). The term object is used in SSE to 
denote entities that perform specific tasks whenever they are called upon by messages. Each rectangular box in the 
communication diagram shows a particular object, the name of which appears in the same box. A communication 
diagram does not include a time axis, because it does not specifically focus on the temporal order of messaging 
among objects. In a communication diagram, messages exchanged among objects are shown by number-tags and 
text-labeled arrows. The temporal order of messages is indicated by the increasing order of number-tags. If a 
message prompted other messages in a system, the prompted messages are nested inside the prompting one. 	
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with full granularity. The communication between the LVL2Supervisor and the LVL2Processing 
is shown by the message labeled “1” in Figure 2.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The communication diagram for the implementation of the HLT system in the ATLAS 
experiment. (Source: ATLAS Collaboration 2003, p. 126, Figure 9-2) 
 
The event fragments, which are temporarily stored in the ROS, are accepted to the level-2 
selection in small amounts. This way of performing event selection is called the seeding 
mechanism in the ATDR (ATLAS Collaboration 2003, sect. 9.5.3.1). Note that if event fragments 
were accepted at once, this would considerably diminish the level-2 trigger decision time and 
thus render the selection process ineffective. The seeding mechanism is initiated by the 
transmission of the message labeled “2.1” by the LVL2Processing unit to the ROS. Upon the 
reception of this message, the ROS sends to the Level2Processing Unit a subset of the event-
fragments data, namely, the information regarding the locations (in the detector), momenta, and 
energies of the events selected at the level-1 selection. This communication between the 
Level2Processing Unit and the ROS is represented by the message labeled “2.2” in the 
communication diagram. The LVL2Processing unit sends the information regarding the events 
accepted by the level-2 trigger system back to the ROS. The LVL2Processing unit also sends the 
same information to the LVL2Supervisor. The foregoing communications are shown respectively 
by the messages labeled “3.1” and “3.2” in the communication diagram. The LVL2Supervisor 
forwards the same information, indicated by the message labeled “4”, to the sub-unit called 
“Event Builder,” which, as shown by the message labeled “5.1”, requests from the ROS the 
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event-fragments data for the events selected by the LVL2Processsing unit. Upon this message, as 
shown by the message labeled “5.2”, the ROS sends the event fragments to the Event Builder. 
The component called “Sub-Farm Input” (SFI) of the Event Builder assembles the event 
fragments associated with each selected event into a single record. Therefore, at this stage, the 
full description of each selected event is available. As shown by the message labeled “6”, the 
events that have been built are then passed to the sub-unit called “Event Filter Processor” (EFP), 
through which the level-3 event selection, which is also called “event filter” (EF) selection, is 
carried out by specialized software algorithms. As shown by the message labeled “7”, the events 
that have passed the level-3 selection are then sent to the sub-unit called “Sub-Farm Output” 
(SFO) for permanent storage and offline data analysis.19 
 
Note that the details of the level-2 and level-3 selection processes are not shown in the 
communication diagram in Figure 2. These selection processes are carried out by the Event 
Selection Software (ESS) system, which is a software component of the HLT system (ATLAS 
Collaboration 2003, sect. 9).20 The details of the level-2 selection process are shown in the 
diagram in Figure 3, which illustrates what is called a sequence diagram21 in SSE. As shown in 
this sequence diagram, the level-2 selection of an event is carried out in a series of steps each of 
which consists of two stages. In the first stage, the event is partially reconstructed, meaning that 
the trigger elements (TEs)22 associated with the event are refined and reconstructed by the 
reconstruction algorithms according to what is called the sequence table of the step. Each 
sequence in this table consists of an input TE and a reconstruction algorithm that is to be 
executed to refine and reconstruct an input TE into an output TE.23 In the second stage, the event 
partially reconstructed undergoes a selection process based on what is called the menu table of 
the step that contains a list of the selection signatures required for this step. 
																																								 																				
19 Note that in the communication diagram shown in Figure 2, the correct number-tags for the messages 
“EFSelection” and “SendEvent” should be “7” and “8” respectively. 
20 For future reference, note that the following units to be mentioned in what follows, namely, Step Handler, Step 
Sequencer, Step Decision, Step Controller and Result Builder, are the software components of the ESS system that 
steers the HLT selection process. 
21Note that the communication and sequence diagrams for the same system contain the same information. However, 
unlike a communication diagram, a sequence diagram focuses on the temporal order of messages exchanged among 
objects in a system (see, e.g., Hoffer et al. 2008, pp. 268–275). In a sequence diagram, time increases down the 
vertical axis. Each object in the system is shown by a rectangular box lying along the horizontal axis at the top of the 
diagram. What is called the lifeline of an object is denoted by either a dashed or a solid line emanating from that 
object and lying along the vertical axis. Each thin rectangular box emanating from an object and superimposed on the 
lifeline of the same object represents the time period during which an object performs a task. Message scripts are 
generally put just above the message arrows, and return messages are typically not shown, as they unnecessarily 
complicate sequence diagrams. 
22 A TE denotes one specific signature identified by the level-1 trigger system, e.g.,“𝑒25𝑖”. A TE is said to be active 
if it has previously satisfied a selection signature at the level-1 selection, or at the previous step of the level-2 
selection, if the step under consideration is not the first step of the level-2 selection. 
23 Reconstruction algorithms are a class of HLT algorithms that act on the RoI data with full granularity from all sub-
detectors to find new features associated with input TEs, such as a track or an isolation requirement.  
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Figure 3: The sequence diagram for the implementation of the ESS system for the level-2 event 
selection in the ATLAS experiment. (Source: ATLAS Collaboration 2003, p. 150, Figure 9.21) 
 
 
As shown in the sequence diagram in Figure 3, the Step Handler initiates the first stage of the 
level-2 selection by executing the Step Sequencer to access the list of the active input TEs 
associated with an event selected by the level-1 trigger system. The Step Sequencer next 
compares the list of the active TEs with the required TEs given in the sequence table of the step. 
For all matching TEs, the Step Sequencer executes the reconstruction algorithms to refine and 
reconstruct the input TEs into the output TEs according to the sequence table of the step. The 
Step Sequencer also creates the list of the output TEs for the implementation of the seeding 
mechanism discussed earlier. The Step Sequencer also marks each output TE as “seeded by input 
TE” depending on from which input TE it has been previously created. Then, it passes each 
output TE to the relevant hypothesis algorithms—another class of HLT algorithms—that decide 
whether the TE is valid, depending on whether its reconstructed features are consistent with its 
physics interpretation. For example, if a track or an isolation requirement associated with a TE is 
found by a reconstruction algorithm, then the relevant hypothesis algorithm determines whether 
this track or isolation requirement matches the physics interpretation of the TE. The hypothesis 
algorithms activate the validated TEs and discard the invalidated TEs by deactivating them.  
 
As shown in the sequence diagram in Figure 3, the Step Handler initiates the second stage of the 
level-2 selection by calling the Step Decision to access the list of the active output TEs, i.e., the 
TEs validated by the hypothesis algorithms in the first stage of the level-1 selection. The Step 
Decision compares the list of the active output TEs with the required selection signatures given in 
the menu table of the step. For the TE combinations that match the selection signatures in the 
menu table, the Step Decision creates a list of the satisfied signatures that consist of those 
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matching TE combinations. The event is accepted for the next step by the Step Decision, if the 
TE combinations it contains satisfy at least one signature given in the menu table of the step; 
otherwise it is rejected and thus not considered for the level-3 selection. In the next step, only 
those TEs that have been used to satisfy at least one signature in the previous step are considered, 
and the others are discarded from further processing. The Step Decision sends the information 
regarding the decision about the event to the Step Handler that will initiate the next step 
configured with a different sequence table and a menu table. The level-2 selection of an event 
ends at the step where it is rejected, or it continues until all required steps are completed, 
indicating that the event is finally accepted for the level-3 selection.  
 
If an event is accepted at the level-2 selection, the Step Controller executes the Result Builder to 
provide the information necessary to seed the level-3 selection. This includes all satisfied 
signatures and the associated TE combinations, as well as the level-1 RoI data. The Result 
Builder assembles all these data-fragments, and the results are subsequently used for the seeding 
of the level-3 selection. The level-3 selection is implemented and coordinated by the Step 
Handler in the similar way as the level-2 selection is carried out as shown in the sequence 
diagram in Figure 3. But, the level-3 selection differs from the level-2 selection in that the TEs 
are now the active TEs of the level-2 selection, and that more sophisticated HLT algorithms are 
used to achieve a much finer event selection. As has been mentioned previously, the events that 
have passed the level-3 selection are stored in the SFO for data analysis.  
 
The above overview indicates that the process of data acquisition in the ATLAS experiment is 
essentially a selection process through which interesting collision events are selected in three 
stages by the ATLAS trigger systems. This selection process consists of various experimental 
procedures that are represented in the ATDR through communication and sequence diagrams 
borrowed from the literature of SSE.24 As shown in Table 2, the communication and sequence 
diagrams shown in Figure 2 and 3 represent the procedural information regarding the 
implementation of the HLT and ESS systems, respectively. This procedural information includes 
both spatial relations, namely, directions of data-flows and those of messages exchanged, as well 
as temporal relations, namely, temporal order of data-flows and that of messages exchanged. In 
both of the aforementioned diagrams, the directions of data-flows and those of messages 
exchanged are represented as spatial relations, namely, text-labeled solid arrows. In the 
communication diagram, the temporal order of data-flows and that of messages exchanged are 
represented by the numerical order of the message number-tags. In the sequence diagram, the 
temporal order of data-flows and that of messages exchanged are represented by the vertical 
spatial order of text-labeled solid arrows.  
																																								 																				
24 The ATDR also uses other types of SSE diagrams. The procedures concerning the flow of various types of data 
between the HLT system and the level-1 trigger system, as well as between the HLT system and the external 
systems, including the LHC machine, the ATLAS detector system and the data storage unit, are represented by what 
is called a context diagram in SSE (see ATDR 2003, Figure 5-1, p. 48; for details about a context diagram in SSE, 
see Hoffer et al. 2008, chap. 7). Moreover, the procedures concerning how the HLT algorithms relate to and depend 
on each other are represented by what is called a class diagram (see ATDR 2003, Figure 9.18, p. 147; for details 
about a class diagram in SSE, see Booch et al. 2007, chap. 3 and sect. 5.7). I shall not discuss the use of the 
foregoing types of diagrams in the ATDR, as they are not necessary for the argument of the present paper. 
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diagrammatic 
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Corresponding 
representing 
relations in diagrams 
Linguistic 
diagrammatic 
elements and 
associated 
conventions 
Symbolic 
diagrammatic 
elements and 
associated 
conventions 
 
 
 
 
Implementation of 
the HLT system: 
communication 
diagram 
Spatial relations: 
directions of data-
flows and of 
messages exchanged 
among the units of 
the HLT system 
Spatial relations: 
directions of text-
labeled solid arrows 
among diagram units 
 
Text labels: contents 
of messages and of 
data flows 
 
Solid arrows: 
directions of solid-
arrows denote 
directions of data-
flows and of 
messages  
 
Temporal relations: 
temporal order of 
messages exchanged 
among the units of 
the HLT system 
Numerical relations: 
numerical order of 
message number-
tags 
 Message number-
tags: numerical 
order of message 
number-tags denotes 
time order of 
messages 
 
 
 
 
Implementation of 
the ESS system: 
sequence diagram 
Spatial relations: 
directions of data-
flows and of 
messages exchanged 
among the units of 
the ESS system 
Spatial relations: 
directions of text-
labeled solid arrows 
among diagram units  
 
 
 
 
 
Text labels: contents 
of messages and of 
data-flows 
Solid arrows: 
directions of 
messages and of 
data-flows 
 
Temporal relations: 
temporal order of 
data-flows and of 
messages exchanged 
among the units of 
the ESS system 
Spatial relations: 
vertical spatial 
order of text-labeled 
solid arrows 
 
 
Table 2: Procedural relations in the ATLAS data acquisition system and their corresponding 
diagrammatic representations together with their linguistic and symbolic diagrammatic elements. 
 
Since the foregoing spatial relations existing among the sub-units of the HLT and ESS systems 
are represented as spatial relations by the communication and sequence diagrams in Figure 2 and 
3 respectively, there exists a structural correspondence, in terms of spatial relations contained, 
between the communication diagram in Figure 2 and the HLT system, as well as between the 
sequence diagram in Figure 3 and the ESS system. As shown in Table 2, the communication and 
sequence diagrams maintain the foregoing structural similarities through the use of both symbolic 
(i.e., consisting of a diagrammatic symbol) and linguistic (i.e., involving both syntactic and 
semantic structures) diagrammatic elements. These diagrams also make use of certain symbolic 
and linguistic elements for the representation of temporal relations.  
 
It is to be noted that by virtue of the aforementioned structural correspondence, the spatial and 
numerical relationships contained in the aforementioned communication and sequence diagrams 
enable one to draw inferences about the spatial and temporal relationships found in the HLT and 
ESS systems of the ATLAS experiment. For example, the temporal order of the messages 
exchanged during the implementation of the HLT system can be inferred by examining the 
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numerical order of the message number-tags in the communication diagram in Figure 2. 
Incidentally, this last point indicates a similarity between the aforementioned diagrams and 
mental models, in that the latter, in Nersessian’s account, also “embody and comply with the 
constraints of the phenomena being reasoned about, and thus enable inferences about these 
phenomena” (Nersessian 2008, p. 129).  
 
 
5. Advantages of diagrams over texts for the representation of data selection and 
acquisition procedures in the ATLAS experiment 
 
The use of communication and sequence diagrams in the ATDR is essential to presenting the data 
selection and acquisition procedures implemented in the ATLAS experiment. Both the 
communication diagram shown in Figure 2 and the sequence diagram shown in Figure 3 are 
presented in the main text of the ATDR, rather than in an appendix, to introduce, respectively, the 
procedures concerning the implementation of the HLT and ESS systems.25 In the main text of the 
ATDR, each of the foregoing diagrams is immediately followed by its corresponding textual 
description (see, ATLAS Collaboration 2003, p. 126 and pp. 150-151, respectively). These 
textual descriptions are provided in the ATDR in a very similar manner as presented in Section 4 
of the present paper. A comparison of the communication and sequence diagrams with their 
corresponding textual descriptions indicates that all the procedural information (regarding the 
implementation of the HLT and ESS systems) that can be inferred from the communication and 
sequence diagrams can also be inferred from their corresponding textual descriptions, and vice 
versa. This suggests that the foregoing diagrammatic and propositional representations of the data 
acquisition and selection procedures implemented in the ATLAS experiment are, to use L&S’s 
terminology, informationally equivalent. 
 
It is also worth noting that unlike the communication and sequence diagrams in Figure 2 and 3, 
the corresponding textual descriptions, in addition, include some short explanations concerning 
the details of the HLT and ESS systems. These explanations are intended to provide the users of 
the ATDR with the information regarding certain key considerations underlying the design of the 
HLT and ESS systems, rather than regarding their implementation in the ATLAS experiment. In 
this sense, they are not essential to the (textual) descriptions of the implementation of the 
foregoing systems. For example, the textual description concerning the implementation of the 
HLT system (following the communication diagram in Figure 2) includes an explanation, which 
is similar to the explanation given in Section 4 of the present paper, as to why the seeding 
mechanism underlying the level-2 event selection is necessary for the HLT process (see ATLAS 
Collaboration 2003, p. 122). Note that this explanation does not include any description at all as 
to how the seeding mechanism is implemented in the HLT system. Rather, it involves the 
primary consideration as to why the seeding mechanism in the level-2 selection is necessary. For 
that reason, the foregoing explanation about the seeding mechanism is not essential to the textual 
description concerning the implementation of the HLT system. 
 
The fact that the communication and sequence diagrams and their corresponding textual 
representations are informationally equivalent does not mean that they are also computationally 
																																								 																				
25 This is also true for the context and class diagrams used in the ATDR. 
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equivalent—in the sense of L&S’s account. In what follows, I shall argue that the diagrammatic 
representations of the data selection and acquisition procedures implemented in the ATLAS 
experiment are computationally more efficient than the textual descriptions of the same 
procedures. To this end, I shall first note that, as indicated by Table 2, the spatial and temporal 
procedural relations that exist in the HLT and ESS systems are represented as spatial and 
numerical relations by the communication and sequence diagrams in Figure 2 and 3. The 
foregoing spatial and temporal procedural relations thereby become directly accessible to visual 
perception. However, the same spatial and temporal procedural relations must be inferred from 
the linguistic (i.e., syntactic and semantic) structures involved in propositional representations 
when they are textually described. As indicated by Table 2, the size of the set comprising the 
linguistic and symbolic diagrammatic elements and their associated conventions used by the 
communication and sequence diagrams in Figure 2 and 3 to represent spatial and temporal 
procedural relations within the HLT and ESS systems is far smaller and less detailed than the size 
of the set comprising the linguistic elements (such as words, verbs and propositions) and their 
associated rules and conventions used by texts to represent the same procedural relations. 
Therefore, it requires more cognitive effort to infer the foregoing relations from the textual 
descriptions than the communication and sequence diagrams. The above considerations regarding 
the differences between the diagrammatic and propositional representations of data selection and 
acquisition procedures in the ATLAS experiment illustrate the perceptual ease of inferring 
information from diagrams, as suggested by L&S’s account. 
 
Another advantage of diagrammatic representations over propositional representations as 
suggested by L&S’s account is their ability to spatially localize the represented information. In 
order to see whether and how this feature of diagrammatic representations plays a role in the case 
of the communication and sequence diagrams in Figure 2 and 3, I shall first note that the various 
procedural relations represented by these diagrams can be regarded as related pieces of 
information about the data selection and acquisition procedures implemented in the ATLAS 
experiment. Second, in the textual descriptions of these experimental procedures presented in the 
ATDR, as the number of pieces of information to be represented increases, the number of 
sentences needed to represent these relations also increases. This in turn results in a gradual 
separation of the representing relations, and thus of the related pieces of information, from each 
other in the textual descriptions. In the remainder of this section, I shall argue that this is an 
unsuitable separation of the related pieces of the relevant procedural information in the sense that 
it makes the textual descriptions less efficient than the corresponding diagrammatic 
representations.  
 
To this end, first, remember that, as pointed out by L&S, diagrams preserve spatial relations to 
the extent that they transform them into spatial relations. As a direct result of this feature, in the 
communication and sequence diagrams in Figure 2 and 3, the incoming and outgoing messages 
associated with a particular unit in the HLT and ESS systems lie adjacent to each other and in the 
proximity of this unit. This illustrates spatial localization of information by diagrammatic 
representation—in the sense of L&S’s account. Therefore, in order to extract the information 
regarding the incoming and outgoing messages associated with a particular object from the 
communication and sequence diagrams, it is sufficient to check only the proximity of the object 
about which the foregoing information is sought, because all the messages relevant to the 
required information are grouped in the proximity of this particular object. This in turn means 
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that, in both the communication and sequence diagrams shown in Figure 2 and 3, the information 
regarding the incoming and outgoing messages associated with a particular unit within the HLT 
and ESS systems can be obtained directly by checking the contents of the text labels for the 
message arrows coming in and out of the object representing this particular unit. For example, in 
order to extract the information regarding the communication between the ROS and the 
LVL2Processing and EventBuilder units from the communication diagram shown in Figure 2, it 
is sufficient to check the contents of the message-texts associated with the ROS, i.e., the 
incoming message-texts labeled “2.1”, “3.1” and “5.1”, and the outgoing message-texts labeled 
“2.2” and “5.2”.  
 
In contrast, in the textual descriptions of the HLT and ESS systems, the sentences representing 
the incoming and outgoing messages associated with the individual units in these systems are 
spread throughout the textual descriptions, rather than grouped together, because, unlike 
diagrammatic representations, propositional representations do not preserve spatial relations. As a 
result, in the foregoing textual descriptions, the sentences relevant to the messaging information 
associated with an individual unit do not necessarily succeed one another without intervening 
sentences whose contents are not relevant to the messaging information. This means that in order 
to extract the messaging information of interest from the corresponding textual description, it is 
necessary to check also the content of each of these intervening sentences. For example, the 
message texts labeled “3.2” and “4” shown in the communication diagram in Figure 2 are neither 
incoming nor outgoing messages for the ROS. Therefore, it is not necessary to take them into 
account in extracting the messaging information associated with the ROS from the 
communication diagram. However, in extracting the same messaging information from the 
corresponding textual description, it is necessary to check the contents of the sentences 
representing the foregoing messages, as they lie among the sentences representing the message 
texts labeled “2.1”, “2.2”, “3.1”, “5.1”, “5.2”, which are relevant to the messaging information of 
interest. The same is true in the case of the messaging information associated with the 
LVL2Supervisor unit, for which, as shown in the communication diagram in Figure 2, the 
message-text labeled “3.2” is the incoming message, and the message-texts labeled “1” and “4” 
are the outgoing messages. Only the foregoing message-texts need to be considered in order to 
extract the messaging information of interest from the communication diagrams. However, in 
order to extract the same messaging information from the corresponding textual description, the 
contents of the sentences representing the message-texts labeled “2”, “2.1”, “2.2” and “3.1”, 
which are not relevant to the messaging information of interest, also need to be taken into 
account, as they lie between the sentences representing the message-texts labeled “3.2” and “4”. 
 
The sequence diagram in Figure 3 also illustrates spatial localization of information by 
diagrammatic representation. This diagram represents the procedural information as to how the 
first and second stages of the level-2 event selection are carried out by the aforementioned 
components of the ESS system. The related pieces of this procedural information for each stage 
of the level-2 selection can be found in the same proximity in the sequence diagram, in that the 
message-texts relevant to the above information for each of the relevant components of the ESS 
system lies in the proximity of the thin rectangular box representing the time period during which 
the component of interest operates. Therefore, in the case of the sequence diagram, the inference 
leading to the above procedural information is direct, in the sense that the related pieces of this 
information can be perceived at once by checking the dashed lines that represent the time lines 
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for the relevant components of the ESS system. The above procedural information can also be 
inferred from the corresponding textual description in the ATDR. However, in this case, the 
inference leading to the information of interest is indirect, in that it cannot be drawn until the 
contents of all the sentences in the textual description are checked and thereby the relevant 
messaging information for each of the components of the ESS is identified.  
 
The above discussion illustrates the spatial localization feature of diagrammatic representations in 
the cases of the communication and sequence diagrams used in the ATDR. In both of these 
diagrams, the message-texts used together to infer a conclusion regarding the communication 
among the different units in the HLT and ESS systems are found in close proximity to each other 
and also to the units under consideration. The advantage offered by this localization feature is 
that it substantially facilitates the cognitive process of inferring the information regarding the 
messaging among the units of the HLT and ESS systems. In contrast, in the textual descriptions 
of these systems presented in the ATDR, the sentences used together to infer the same messaging 
information are separated from each other in ways that substantially complicate the inference 
process.  
 
The discussion in this section suggests that by virtue of their representational features, namely, 
perceptual ease and spatial localization, the communication and sequence diagrams used in the 
ATDR are better suited for the representation of the HLT and ESS related procedures than their 
corresponding textual descriptions, even though diagrammatic and textual descriptions are 
informationally equivalent in this case. It is to be noted that the aforementioned advantages of the 
diagrams of SSE apply only if all the rules and conventions of these diagrams are known to the 
users of the ATDR. Incidentally, this last point relates to the notion of visual literacy, which 
Daniel Rothbart has illustrated in the context of the design of experimental instruments. Rothbart 
has remarked that “[e]xperiments in contemporary research are often depicted through visual 
language, based on schematic drawings associated with an instrument’s design” and that this 
requires visual literacy about diagrams, namely, that one must know what the individual symbols 
stand for in a given diagram in order to extract the relevant information from this diagram. 
(Rothbart 2003, p. 239). In a similar way, the present-case study suggests that extracting the 
procedural information concerning the ATLAS data acquisition system from the diagrams 
presented in the ATDR requires visual literacy about these diagrams. This point is especially 
important for the training of newcomers, especially young experimenters, to the ATLAS 
Collaboration, as these diagrams are also used to train them about the essential features of the 
ATLAS data acquisition system.  
 
6. Conclusions 
 
In this paper, I have shown that the procedural information represented by the communication 
and sequence diagrams in the ATDR illustrates how the data selection and acquisition procedures 
are carried out by means of software and hardware based automated devices in a large-scale HEP 
experiment. Since the foregoing diagrams of SSE are used in the ATDR to represent 
experimental procedures, in terms of the content of diagrammatic representations, the present 
case study differs from much of the recent philosophical studies that have examined various types 
of diagrams used to represent scientific claims about natural phenomena such as hypotheses, 
models and mechanisms. The general line of argument in these studies is that in scientific 
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practice there are cases in which diagrammatic representations are more appropriate for scientific 
explanation and model construction than propositional representations (see, e.g., Perini 2005; 
Goodwin 2010; Barberousse 2013; Sheredos et al. 2013). Some of these recent studies have 
explicitly drawn upon the localization feature of diagrammatic representations, as suggested by 
L&S’s account (see, e.g., Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005; Jones and Wolkenhauer 2012). Unlike 
the foregoing studies that are concerned with the epistemic value of using diagrams in 
representing scientific claims, the present case study suggests that diagrams are more appropriate 
than texts to represent the procedural information necessary to perform a large-scale HEP 
experiment, such as the ATLAS and CMS experiments at CERN’s LHC.  
 
An important implication of the above conclusion concerns the practical value of using diagrams 
in the ATDR for the collaborative work of designing the ATLAS data acquisition system. The 
procedures of this system are carried out jointly by internal and external research groups (for 
details, see ATLAS Collaboration 2003, sect. 17), as the system consists of three different trigger 
systems that are connected to the external systems such as the ATLAS detector system and the 
CERN data management system. This suggests that the collaborative work of designing the 
ATLAS data acquisition system had both internal stakeholders, such as trigger groups, and 
external stakeholders, such as detector operation and data analysis groups. Given that the 
procedural information represented by both texts and the diagrams of SSE in the ATDR involves 
the design requirements for the data selection and acquisition procedures in the ATLAS 
experiment, an efficient communication of the foregoing procedural information among the 
stakeholders was necessary in order for the collaborative design work to achieve its intended 
objectives. The analysis offered in the previous section shows that by virtue of their 
representational features, namely, perceptual ease and spatial localization of information, the 
cognitive process of inferring the procedural information regarding the data selection and 
acquisition procedures in the ATLAS experiment from the diagrams of SSE is substantially less 
complex than the cognitive process of inferring the same procedural information from their 
corresponding textual descriptions. Therefore, the present case study suggests that the diagrams 
of SSE used in the ATDR were better suited than their corresponding textual descriptions to 
provide a medium for efficient communication of the relevant procedural information among the 
stakeholders of the collaborative work of designing the ATLAS data acquisition system. 
 
The above considerations indicate an important difference between the diagrams of SSE 
examined in this paper and Gooding’s maps, despite the fact that they both represent 
experimental procedures. It is to be noted that Gooding’s maps are aimed at a diagrammatic 
reconstruction of the procedures of Faraday’s experiments that eventually led him to theorize the 
law of electromagnetic induction. In this sense, Gooding’s maps are part of a retrospective 
analysis of Faraday’s experiments on electromagnetic induction, rather than being an essential 
part of these experiments. Unlike Gooding’s maps, the foregoing diagrams of SSE have been an 
essential part of the instrumentation needed to carry out the ATLAS experiment, in that they have 
been used as visual tools in the collaborative work of designing the data acquisition system of 
this experiment. Moreover, as I have argued above, by virtue of their representational features, 
these diagrams have served an important communicatory function in the aforementioned 
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collaborative design work.26 Therefore, the conclusions of the present paper go beyond 
illustrating Gooding’s idea that the procedural aspects of an experiment can be elucidated through 
diagrammatic representations of experimental procedures. They also show that these 
representations have a particular communicatory value in the practice of experimental HEP. 
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